The question of federal constitutional free speech rights for undocumented speakers is generally unexplored in case law 1 and in law review literature. 2 The underdevelopment of case law and scholarship in this area likely reflects an analytical misstep. As it turns out, the analysis can be crucially misconceived if it is focused narrowly and directly on the claimed free speech rights of undocumented speakers themselves.
In contrast, the analysis below recognizes and develops the point that free speech is often not simply a matter of speakers themselves, or even the content of their speech, the conditions under which they speak, and the restrictions under which speakers may labor. Free speech is not reducible to these elements or any combination thereof.
Crucially, free speech rights are what we may call complementary, or "inherently relational." In any given context, free speech rights are held jointly and severally by actual or potentially willing speakers and, equally, by actual or potentially willing  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law -Indianapolis. The author hereby thanks Maria Lopez, Jennifer Ekblaw, and Rachel Anne Scherer.
1. For as close as the case holdings apparently come, see a number of the authorities cited infra Part IV.
2. For an extremely valuable but relatively narrow treatment focusing on "extraordinary speech" of undocumented immigrants to law enforcement officials concerning primarily health and safety code violations, and under the right to "petition the Government for redress of grievances," see generally Free speech rights are in this sense essentially complementary, or inherently relational. They are held jointly by speakers and potential willing speakers and by listeners and potential willing listeners, in equal measure. But for our purposes, it is vital to notice that these complementary or relational rights may typically be exercised severally, or in the ability of an audience to listen to a particular speaker. More directly relevant for our purposes, a potential audience member may properly object to restrictions on the speech of otherwise willing speakers. 3 Thus, where potential audience members hold certain free speech rights, those rights may carry practical implications for the way the law should treat any willing potential speakers the potential audience wishes to hear.
The inherent complementarity of free speech rights means that in certain cases, audience or potential audience free speech rights will require what we might call pragmatic or de facto speech rights, of whatever strength and scope, for all those persons the potential audience wishes to hear.
More specifically, and most directly relevant to our concerns, there will be many instances in which fully enfranchised adult United States citizen-voters and documented aliens will wish to hear, on subjects of public interest, from some or all undocumented persons within the United States. Merely for the sake of simplicity, we shall refer hereafter to those who wish to hear from undocumented persons as citizen-voters.
On some narrow or technical issues, it may be reasonable to wish to listen only to some combination of documented immigrants, economists, sociologists, politicians, advocates, journalists, think-tanks, social workers, or other technical experts.
But some citizen-voters will inevitably wish to hear from some or all undocumented persons on a wide range of public issues. The point of listening to some range of undocumented persons would not be to automatically override the voices of documented aliens, of social scientists, or of citizens in general. The idea would instead normally be to consider and weigh the distinctive contribution to the discussion that the range of undocumented alien perspectives might bring.
Such an approach would be perfectly sensible as a matter of the general doctrinal rights of willing audience members to hear potentially willing speakers. 4 And such an approach would also be consistent with the underlying logic of the values and purposes of freedom of speech in the first place.
5 It is perfectly defensible to believe that traditionally cited free speech values, including the pursuit of truth and the
3.
See infra Part II.
4.
5.
See infra Part III.
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UNDOCUMENTED SPEAKERS 501 effective functioning of political democracy, among other such values, 6 may be best served by listening to any and all undocumented speakers, of whatever viewpoint, on a broad range of issues.
In such cases, the uncontroversial free speech rights driving the analysis are those of the willing audience. The idea of the citizen-voter as bearing free speech rights is beyond question. And the free speech rights of a sub-set of citizen-voters, as a potential audience, may well be violated if the undocumented speakers, that the potential audience wishes to hear, are discouraged by the government from speaking. Realistically, even after-the-fact sanctions on undocumented speakers, whether in the form of technical punishment or not, may well discourage further speech. 8 There may well be cases in which the clear and uncontested free speech rights of citizen-voters are substantially burdened or simply violated by government action, of whatever sort, that inhibits or somehow restricts the speech of undocumented persons.
9 In all such cases, the inherent relationality of free speech operates, in effect, to confer certain "pragmatic" free speech rights on any or all undocumented persons any citizen-voter may wish to hear.
10
This would follow regardless of the preferences of any particular citizen-voter. Any citizen-voter may wish to hear from some or all undocumented persons, on a narrower or broader range of issues, perhaps from some specific viewpoints, or not. Some citizen-voters may wish to hear what amounts to a monologue from undocumented speakers, while others may prefer to engage in dialogue or some more pluralistic discussion. Free speech rights can be grounded in a potential willing audience of as few as one person. But in the aggregate, when the preferences and rights of all such citizen-voters are totaled up, the net effect will inevitably be, in practical effect, what amounts to a substantial and robust set of free speech rights for undocumented persons in general.
More precisely, the free speech rights of undocumented speakers do not arise and disappear in immediate correspondence with any particular citizen-voter"s wish to hear or not hear from such undocumented speakers. The free speech right of undocumented speakers may predate or anticipate a likely future expression of interest by citizen-voters and survive any temporary abeyance of such interest. The free speech rights of undocumented speakers may thus be based on undocumented speech as an available resource, as distinct from merely an on-demand service. These "pragmatic" free speech rights held by undocumented persons are no less real and substantial even if any particular undocumented person chooses not to speak. Correspondingly, citizen-voters do not generally have a free speech right to compel undocumented persons to speak publicly if the latter would prefer not to speak. And it is also clear that the "practical" free speech rights of undocumented persons remain in effect if some, or even many, citizen-voters would prefer that they not speak.
11
After all, a citizen-voter"s wish to hear a speaker or message, in an appropriate time, place, and manner, is generally not subject to "veto" by some objecting party with the ability to avoid listening.
12
In any event, the argument below is intended to clarify, elaborate upon, and otherwise strengthen this "relational" approach to undocumented speakers and freedom of speech. As we shall also see, other approaches to the problem of undocumented speakers are certainly possible, but they bring with them their own limitations, complications, and controversies. This principle reflects the importance to our society of free, open, and unconstrained debate in general, and the value of dispelling any potential "chill" or inhibition of such debate as expeditiously as possible. 16 On the merits, it is well established, with impeccable logic, that freedom of speech generally is in large measure a matter of the rights of listeners and would-be listeners. Crucially, the rights of listeners are not simply derivative of independent rights of speakers: "More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." 17 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker." 18 Assuming such a speaker, "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both." 19 Crucially for our purposes, the Court has denied any general principle that "freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker"s listeners could come by his message by some other means. . . . Nor have we recognized any such limitation on the independent right of the listener to receive the information sought to be communicated." 20 Thus it may be impermissible for the government to suppress the ability of undocumented persons to speak even if the views and emotions of undocumented persons could always be obtained from other sources.
Our point is again not that undocumented persons have free speech rights, and that violation of those rights also burdens the free speech rights of interested citizenvoters. It is instead that citizen-voters unquestionably possess the free speech rights 504 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 of listeners or information-seekers and would-be speech recipients, and that these rights will often, as a practical matter, require pragmatic free speech rights of undocumented speakers, particularly on matters of public import 21 on which at least some citizen-voters will wish to be broadly informed. More concisely, guaranteeing speech rights to undocumented persons is a matter of making some citizen-voter free speech rights real and meaningful, in light of the basic purposes of the institution of freedom of speech.
22
This does not mean that undocumented persons are not properly subject to valid immigration law and process whenever the free speech rights of citizen-voters would be adversely affected thereby. 23 It would be odd if immigration law, or prison law for that matter, 24 were fundamentally driven by, and shaped even in detail by, the free speech rights of citizen-voters.
But it would be equally odd to claim that immigration law, or prison law, has absolutely no effect on the nature, meaning, and value of citizen-voter free speech rights. Immigration law cannot be entirely insulated from free speech law. Imagine, hypothetically, an immigration statute that prohibits anyone subject to a final, unappealed order of deportation from communicating about their case, or any other matter of public interest, with any journalist, publisher, or any other media. We need not say that such a statute would be facially invalid, or should be denied application in any particular case. And we need not assume any deportee free speech rights. Our argument here is merely that in such a case, the free speech rights of the media, and of the media"s audiences, would be implicated, and should properly be taken into account, to one degree or another, in denying any free speech rights of the deportees.
As a matter of realistic necessity, audience free speech rights in such cases would imply practical free speech rights, of whatever strength and scope, on the part of those subject to final orders of deportation. This logic would of course apply at least as forcefully to undocumented persons not subject to such deportation orders, or not yet even informally determined to lack documentation.
It is thus certainly not that any free speech interest must outweigh or trump any immigration policy with which such an interest may be in tension. Rather, free speech interests of both speakers and audiences 25 fundamental importance, and must be taken into proper account as far as those interests extend.
It is important to note the range of circumstances under which the audience rights of citizen-voters might be impaired by government policies affecting undocumented persons. A wide range of government actions and policies, at various levels, may operate to "chill" undocumented speech, whether the person"s status as undocumented has been formally established or brought to official attention or not. Certainly, the fear of deportation may suffice to inhibit speech by undocumented persons, whether the practical sanction of deportation would reflect official disagreement with the content of the undocumented person"s speech or not. 26 Deportation, certainly, is generally considered a civil as opposed to a criminal process. 27 Thus deportation typically does not qualify as a punishment, 28 no matter how "burdensome and severe" 29 deportation may be for the alien. But the risk of deportation can certainly suffice to deter or inhibit speech. Government actions or policies need not even be formal, let alone punitive in status, to inhibit free speech. As we have seen, recognition of "pragmatic" free speech rights of undocumented persons, for the sake most fundamentally of the free speech rights of citizen-voters, is more than a matter of narrow legal doctrine. The idea is built into the basic logical structure of inherently related and mutually dependent speakers and audiences.
32
But the logic of "pragmatic" or derivative free speech rights for undocumented persons extends, more deeply, into the level of the basic reasons for constitutionally protecting freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is not an end in itself. It is protected for certain reasons. 33 The idea is that freedom of speech honors certain values or, even more importantly, tends especially to actually promote certain aims, values, goals and achievements. 34 Several such aims are commonly cited. We shall focus, briefly, on those free speech aims that seem least controversial and most important in accounting for the link between the uncontroversial free speech rights of citizen-voters and the realistically implicated "pragmatic" free speech rights of undocumented persons who might be sought out by some citizen-voters as sources of information and insight.
Perhaps most obviously, freedom of speech can distinctively contribute to the optimal functioning of a fully democratic, open, responsive, participatory government and administration, at all levels.
35 Under this rubric we may include some reasonably The importance of broadly unconstrained public discussions to a genuinely open democratic government has been recognized not only by theorists across the political spectrum, 37 but by the Supreme Court itself. 38 The Court has emphasized the role of the First Amendment "in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas." 39 Classically, Justice Brandeis asserted that "public discussion is a political duty,"
40 that "it is hazardous to discourage thought," 41 and that the Framers believed "in the power of reason as applied through public discussion."
42
The Court adopted a number of Justice Brandeis" themes in the classic public official libel case of New York Times v. Sullivan. 43 Justice Brennan, for the Court in Sullivan, famously recognized our "profound national commitment to the principle THE PEOPLE 27, 75 (1960) (1948) (first amendment primarily aimed at the goal that "all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life"). Notice in particular how Professor Meiklejohn"s controversial limitation concerning political understanding by citizens does not tend to undermine, and in fact is compatible with, our approach herein. Realistically, citizens" full understanding of public issues requires unconstrained speech on such matters by undocumented persons.
For 36. For discussion, see, for example, EMERSON, supra note 33, at 7; Blasi, supra note 35, at 574; Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 141 (referring to the public interest in "interest accommodation and social stability"). To the extent we rely herein on the particular free speech value of interest accommodation and social stability, we do not wish to beg our primary question by merely assuming that any proper accommodation of the interests of undocumented persons would grant such persons general free speech rights within United States territory. This is not to claim that in these contexts the Court has recognized and endorsed the free speech rights of undocumented persons in particular. That judicial fact does not undermine our argument; it merely provides the occasion for, or makes necessary, our argument herein. "[U]ninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 46 public discussion, even among citizen-voters alone, requires that appropriate weight be given to the various preferences among some citizen-voters for access to a broad range of undocumented persons" willingly expressed perspectives, including their experiences and views on a broad range of public issues.
Those citizen-voters who are indifferent or hostile to such expressions have the classic remedy of not being compelled to listen. 47 As the Court observed in Cohen v. California,
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilection.
48
Of course, our focus herein is not precisely on the silencing of undocumented persons, but on the silencing of their invited discourse and on, directly, the free speech rights of those citizen-voters whose access to invited undocumented perspectives would be impaired. Related, but certainly worthy of separate mention, is the role of the widely recognized free speech value of the pursuit of truth. 49 There is no evidence that undocumented immigrants are widely incapable of contributing distinctively to the search for truth about immigration policy, in its experiential or its more objective dimensions, or for that matter, on any matter of public interest. But even this easilymet standard exceeds what is necessary to advance our thesis in this narrow respect. All our thesis requires is that some percentage of citizen-voters believe that undocumented willing speakers are capable at various times of usefully contributing to an ongoing or anticipated public discussion at any governmental level. Any more demanding standard, as noted above in connection with the free speech value of democracy, 50 would violate the Court"s clear desire in Cohen 51 not to empower censorious majorities. 1986) . But merely for the sake of the simplicity and reduced controversiality of the argument, we assume that focusing on these particular values as undergirding freedom of speech would add little weight to the arguments above, or else would be seen as biased in favor of pragmatic, if not formal, free speech rights for undocumented persons, in some question-begging way.
53. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (permitting distinctions among classes of resident aliens for Medicare benefits eligibility purposes; observing that simply because "all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification"); Kim Ho the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and the Fifth Amendment due process clause or its equal protection "component" 57 might uncontroversially smooth the path to free speech rights of undocumented persons as against state and federal actors.
One obstacle, at least of a formal nature, for such arguments is that the First Amendment does not clearly and unequivocally indicate the class of free speech right holders.
58 By its terms, the First Amendment simply bars Congress from abridging an apparent institution referred to as "the freedom of speech." 59 The scope of protected speakers is not otherwise specified. The freedom of speech protected therein could be that of "persons" or perhaps of "the people. Based on the text of the First Amendment, it is thus possible to argue that undocumented persons, either as an entirety, or those of only minimal or transient United States residency, do not fall within the scope of constitutionally protected speakers. It is difficult to imagine that the distinction between documented and undocumented aliens was especially meaningful, let alone important, in the historical adoption of the language of the First Amendment in general, or the free speech clause in particular. 61 Let us assume, though, that undocumented, along with documented, immigrants count as "persons" under the equal protection clause, as cases such as Plyler v. Doe 62 evidently establish. From the premise that both documented and undocumented aliens are persons for equal protection or due process purposes, it still might be controversial to infer that undocumented persons, along with documented persons, should hold free speech rights. Some substantive argument to that effect would then still be necessary.
Such a substantive argument would be necessary because of the general principle that, for some purposes, it is constitutionally permissible to treat different classes of aliens differently, and to accord different rights to different classes of aliens. 63 Certainly, there is case authority at least casually recognizing free speech rights for "aliens" as a general classification. 64 But the leading cases recognizing free speech
The basic logic of this transition from an undocumented student"s enforceable constitutional equal protection right to attend public school to some minimal degree of indirect free speech protection in school for that undocumented student seems clear enough. The undocumented student, under Plyler, has an enforceable constitutional equal protection right to attend an established public school system on basically equal terms with other students. 76 Suppose two students, one undocumented and one not, were disciplined for distributing political literature on school grounds. As a matter of equal protection under Plyler, would we want to apply the standard Tinker 77 free speech test in the case of the documented student, but no free speech test at all in the case of the otherwise similarly situated undocumented student? Might granting Tinker protection to one student"s speech, but lesser or no protection to the undocumented student"s speech, on grounds of undocumented status, violate the undocumented student"s equal protection rights under Plyler? Must we read Plyler as recognizing attendance rights for undocumented students, but absolutely no free speech rights while duly enrolled?
Even though this argument seems sound , it cannot not be herein relied upon because it is controversial how far the argument actually goes. Plyler, after all, may rest at least in part on the predictably disastrous consequences of large numbers of unschooled adults. 78 It would be less plausible to predict disastrous consequences if undocumented student speech rights were determined solely by state statute or local rule, rather than by the First Amendment. Some might well read Plyler to require only minimum scrutiny equal protection in the case of restrictions on the public school speech of undocumented students. Or perhaps Plyler should be read to protect undocumented students" speech rights only where the students" ability to attend school is implicated.
Even if we read Plyler, sensibly, to require something like the Tinker free speech test for undocumented students where it is similarly applied to documented students, it remains controversial how far Plyler's equal protection rights should be extended to undocumented persons generally in various non-school contexts. Our approach, by contrast, is admittedly indirect. But our approach does have the advantage of a less controversial and more robust appeal to the free speech rights, as listeners, of citizenvoters. It is difficult to imagine courts" generally concluding that the free speech rights of citizen-voters who wish to hear undocumented speakers should evoke only 514 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 minimum scrutiny in their defense. 79 For these reasons, we have thus chosen not to place much reliance on Plyler's equal protection logic to generally validate undocumented free speech rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The uncontroversial free speech rights of individual citizen-voters, as willing potential listeners to a range of potentially willing undocumented speakers on a plethora of subjects, imply pragmatic free speech rights to undocumented speakers. What, though, are the distinctive limits of such pragmatic free speech rights?
For one thing, if we assume a settled immigration law, the free speech rights of citizen-voters, as individuals, cannot realistically be expected to trump any limitation on the immediate physical presence of any willing speaker from anywhere around the world. 80 A particular citizen"s desire to hear a willing speaker from a foreign country, in face-to-face conversation, will, of course, not typically overturn otherwise valid immigration law.
Additionally, any approach, such as ours, that focuses on undocumented speech communication directly or indirectly with citizens-voters, will leave other sorts of valuable speech by undocumented persons protected only on more complex grounds, or only through the separate constitutional protection of due process and against unreasonable searches and seizures. undocumented persons, as well as materials such as computer files, phone records and diary entries by undocumented persons, could be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, or sometimes more directly as preparatory to later direct or indirect discussion with one or more citizen-voters. 82 We may conclude by noting explicitly that we have typically assumed throughout, for the sake of simplifying the argument, that all undocumented persons can be instantly and uncontroversially recognized as "undocumented" for free speech purposes. In many cases, however, a free speech argument may crystallize before there is any sort of administrative or judicial determination, let alone a final judgment, that the speaker in question is in any sense undocumented. 83 Often, the government official restricting the speech at issue will have no special competence or jurisdiction over immigration matters. 84 The undocumented status we have been assuming throughout must not be casually assumed by officials who may be inclined to restrict speech. In this respect, much of this Essay has in effect conservatively assumed that justifying restrictions on the speech of undocumented persons is easier than it actually is.
